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This article analyses the policy debate surrounding the possible expansion of government 
contracting with faith-based providers of social services, from the perspective of recent 
developments in the economics of contracts. It presents a non-technical introduction to 
the economic tools used in the study of contracts, in particular the decision faced by 
governments of whether to provide services in-house or to contract out to a private 
nonprofit organization. In particular the paper looks at the problems of monitoring the 
quality of service provision and ensuring fairness in the procurement process. When the 
analysis is applied to the question of faith-based provision, the conclusion is that 
monitoring the terms of the contract is less of an issue than the debates that will arise 









The challenges and outcomes arising from the increased scale of government contracting 
with faith-based providers of services in the US, especially since the Charitable Choice 
provisions of the 1996 welfare reform, have generated a significant scholarly literature: 
on the interpretation of constitutional provisions protecting free expression and non-
establishment of religion; on whether allowing faith-based providers to be exempt from 
some of the usual government regulations on contractors enhances or lessens equality of 
opportunity amongst potential contractors; on whether faith-based organizations are 
efficient or cost-effective relative to secular providers or government agencies; on the 
administrative challenges for the parties to these new forms of contracting; and more. 
 Policy issues on contracting with faith-based providers have also arisen at the 
state level. For example, Georgia is one of a number of states whose constitution contains 
a “Blaine Amendment”: a provision that “no money shall ever be taken from the public 
treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, cult, or religious denomination 
or of any sectarian institution.” In 2004 Georgia Governor Perdue proposed amending the 
state constitution to add to the existing Blaine Amendment the phrase “except as 
permitted or required by the United States Constitution, as amended”. The stated goal 
was to put the state’s ability to contract with faith-based organizations at the same level 
as the federal government. Despite the efforts of the Governor, Georgians did not see this 
amendment put to referendum. Georgia’s Blaine Amendment, like those in other states, 
was introduced at the end of the 19th century in an effort to preclude Catholics from 
making a claim to public funds for the establishment of parochial schools. Of course the 
public school system at the time was religious, with students educated in a generic 
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Protestantism and reading from the Protestant Bible. In 2004, even though the proposed 
changes to the state constitution were aimed at loosening restrictions on what 
organizations could contract with the government to deliver social services, it was, as in 
the 19th century, the fate of schools that determined the outcome of the debate; opposition 
to the Governor’s proposal were centered on whether it would enable school vouchers. 
 This paper levitates away from some of the details of contracting, at the federal 
and state levels, with faith-based providers, so that we can view this contracting from the 
broader perspective of government-financed services and the possible means of their 
delivery. An aerial view of the forest might tell us some things about the trees that are 
hard to detect from ground-level. 
 The “economic perspective” taken will be to look at the possibilities of 
contracting for service delivery in the presence of transaction costs and necessarily 
“incomplete” contracts. Thus by “economic” I do not mean that unfortunate 
characterization whereby all participants in a contract would have perfect knowledge of 
everything relevant and would be motivated by whatever actions would maximize a 
narrowly-conceived self-interest. Instead, parties are motivated not only by their own 
well-being, but also to varying degrees by what they believe to be in the interests of their 
clients, and the organizations, secular or faith-based, for whom they work. Contracts are 
incomplete because it is impossible to fully specify what actions are to be taken under 
every possible contingency (thus contracts must allow for discretion on the part of the 
service-provider), and because there are aspects of the quality of service provision that 
are inherently subjective, and cannot be verified by an external adjudicator, in the way 
that the quantity of service provision can be verified. In such a world, when does it make 
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sense for a government to contract with a private-sector service provider? And, the 
motivation of this paper, how does the answer change if some of the private-sector 
providers bidding for contracts are faith-based organizations? 
 
The Economics of Incomplete Contracts 
 Much of the literature on incomplete contracts relies heavily on sophisticated 
mathematics, which is important for clarity in establishing the assumptions of the models 
and how the results are derived, but which carries the cost of making the analysis 
inaccessible to many interested readers. This section summarizes the key aspects of the 
models and their results without the use of mathematics. 
 Suppose the government has determined that it wishes some service to be 
provided to the public. We can imagine possibilities for delivery of the service: it could 
be administered through a department of the government; there could be a contract with a 
secular or a faith-based nonprofit organization; there could be a contract with a secular or 
faith-based for-profit firm; or there could some combination of these possibilities. Which 
is the best choice? A surprising result is that if it were possible to write complete 
contracts, that specified precisely what was to be done, and not to be done, by the service 
provider, and every aspect of contract performance could be verified by the government, 
and by an external adjudicator should a dispute arise, then it would not make any 
difference whether the government provided the service in-house or contracted out to a 
private provider, whether nonprofit or for-profit. 
 That whether there is contracting out doesn’t matter in the perfect world sketched 
above is a variant of the insight by Coase (1937) arising from his study of the “make-or-
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buy” decisions of private firms: with perfect, costless contracting it makes no difference 
whether the manager of a firm directs one of her own employees to perform a task or 
hires someone from outside the firm to do it, since the costs to the manager (whether in 
wages to her employee or in payments to the outside contractor) and the quality of the 
performance of the task will be the same in each case. 
 The point of discussing this abstract case of perfect contracts is to narrow the 
focus on what does matter. Coase found that the boundaries of an individual firm will be 
determined by the relative effectiveness of in-house or contracted services as a result of 
the costs of forming and monitoring employment contracts and contracts with agencies 
external to the firm. The modern literature on Coase’s problem emphasizes the incentives 
of the owner of the relevant assets to invest in innovation, given the discretion allowed by 
incomplete contracts, and thus derives the most efficient ownership structure of assets – 
i.e. whether two firms ought to merge, or contract with each other as independent entities 
– and is often known as the “property rights” theory of the firm (Grossman and Hart, 
1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; 2003; Tirole, 1999). There are subtle differences between 
the transaction cost models of Coase and Williamson and the property rights models 
(Whinston, 2001), but they are not an important factor in the questions raised by this 
paper.  
 Applying the result to government contracts, we would say that in a perfect world 
the government could completely specify the service it wants provided, with instructions 
on what is to be done under uncertain contingencies, to the manager of a government 
department or to a private agency, and the government could monitor the outcomes, and 
the contract would specify what net payments would be made by the government to the 
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service provider under each contingency; in this case whether there is contracting out 
would not matter. But contracting out does matter because we do not have the ability to 
form such complete contracts, and the imperfections in real world contracts will play out 
differently in different contexts. 
 In the rest of this section of the paper we look at two spheres where our imperfect 
ability to specify and monitor performance are important in government contracting: the 
inability to perfectly contract over the quality of service provision; and the inability to 
perfectly monitor the procurement process. 
 
Monitoring the Quality of Service Provision 
 I will use “quality” to refer to what the government contractor of the service 
regards as quality, the outcome that the government contractor wants. It is not usually 
going to be a single variable. In the privatization of prisons, for example, quality would 
include the rehabilitation of inmates, their safety, humane conditions in terms of how 
they are housed and fed, and so on. For counseling services for those with addiction 
problems, quality includes success at getting individuals to overcome their addiction, but 
also whether they are treated with due respect. 
 Problems in contracting arise because, first, quality cannot be perfectly monitored 
by the government funder, and second, the incentives for the provision of quality by the 
service provider are in general unlikely to be a perfect match with what the government 
funder would hope for. We can generalize by thinking about two kinds of incentive 
problems. 
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 First, it may be the case that the service provider would not dispute the 
government contractor’s definition of “quality” in service delivery, but the service 
provider is able, and has the incentive, to provide lower quality than promised as a way of 
lowering costs, and to keep the fact that quality was low hidden from the government 
funder. Even with detailed measures of outputs or outcomes applied to the service 
provider, it will not be possible for the government to perfectly determine whether an 
observed poor outcome is due to the contracted service provider’s behavior or random 
bad luck in external factors affecting productivity. For-profit service providers would find 
a strategy of cost-saving quality-cutting could increase profits, and nonprofit providers, 
although they are constrained to some degree from cash distribution of the gains from 
cost savings (Hansmann, 1980; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001) might also benefit from the 
potential increase in net revenues as it could allow the potentially-preferred cross-
subsidization of other activities undertaken by the organization. 
 Second, it may be the case that the service provider does care about quality of 
service provision, and is committed to providing as high a level of quality as is feasible, 
but that it has a different definition of quality than that held by the government funder. In 
such a case, with incomplete contracting and imperfect monitoring by government, the 
service provider uses the funds to provide services in keeping with its own definition of 
quality rather than the government’s. For example, in a contract to provide services 
helping individuals find steady employment, the government funder might define 
“quality” as getting the highest number of individuals to move from being unemployed to 
being employed, while the service provider might define “quality” as directing the bulk 
of its efforts to the individual clients with the least potential for employment in the 
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absence of assistance, even if this means that the overall effects on employment of the 
client base are lower than they could have been. 
 The solution to the problem of whether to contract out service delivery under the 
first kind of incentive problem begins with comparing the incentives facing a private 
service provider and a government in-house provider. In general, public employees have 
“low-powered incentives” (Tirole, 1994); that is, there are relatively low rewards paid to 
the public employee who discovers an innovation that leads to either improved quality of 
service provision without increasing costs, or lower costs without diminishing the quality 
of service. Further, there are no rewards at all for implementing practices that lower costs 
but at a cost of lowering quality. Private service-providers have higher-powered 
incentives, in that innovations bring higher rewards: cost-saving or quality-improving 
measures allow the organization to win more contract tenders, and in the case of for-
profit providers generate personal monetary rewards. If there is contracting out for 
service delivery, the higher-powered incentives in the private sector give government the 
benefit of an increased pace of innovation, but at the cost of a higher incentive for the 
service provider to mislead the government by promising a higher quality per dollar than 
is actually to be delivered. The higher the potential for innovation, and the harder it is to 
mask cuts in quality, the more favorable is the contracting out option. Provision of 
government-funded services in-house is preferred when the potential benefits from 
innovations are low, and where cost-saving, hidden cuts in quality are hard to detect, and 
carry possibly severe consequences. (This is the central conclusion of Hart, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997); also see Shleifer (1998) and Hart (2003)). Indeed, Williamson (1999) 
argues that situations where the government must be able to have absolute confidence in 
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the provision of a service explain why government employees have low-powered 
incentives: it is preferable to the risk of having the service provider, whether within 
government or in the private sector, taking risks in search of rewards for being an 
innovator. Using the foreign service as an archetypical example of a situation where 
probity is crucial, he applies the apt dictate of Tallyrand: “above all, no zeal” 
(Williamson, 1999, p. 323). 
 An interesting turn on this model is provided by Francois (2000). Suppose 
government managers have low-powered incentives and private sector managers have 
higher-powered incentives. Then front-line service providers might be more motivated in 
the public sector. The reasoning is that if the service providers care about the quality of 
service provision, they will know that if they shirk on their duties the private sector 
manager will work hard to shift inputs to rectify the problem, but the government 
manager will not. So in the public sector, workers know “if I don’t get the job done, no 
one will”. This gives the counter-intuitive result that low-powered incentives for 
government managers induce higher performance from staff.   
 But Francois’ model is still open to the second type of incentive problem, where 
the service provider’s notion of quality differs from the government funder’s definition, 
but where quality by either party’s definition cannot be completely specified in a 
contract. The problem here is different from the first case, since even though public 
sector employees have low-powered monetary incentives, they still have personal goals 
and ideals which might cause them, if they can do so in way that can be concealed from 
their managers, to direct their efforts in service provision in a slightly different direction 
than their managers have asked for. In other words, the employees care about the quality 
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of service delivery, but define quality differently than their managers. In this case it is not 
clear that in-house service provision or contracting out are very different, except to the 
extent that monitoring of in-house provision might be easier than monitoring an outside 
agency. But that is not necessarily the case. For example, suppose a middle-manager in 
government is assigned the task of reporting on the performance of the service delivery 
staff. While this person could be in a better position to observe the effort and methods 
adopted by in-house service delivery staff, she might also be more reluctant to report 
questionable performance of in-house staff to her senior management, owing to the 
various motives she might have for promoting harmony between herself and her staff. In 
other words, a contracted agency might be more difficult, or less difficult, for senior 
management to observe. Does a Dean receive more accurate information about faculty 
performance from the department chair or from an external review committee? The 
answer depends on the relative importance of measures of such things as faculty effort in 
department service and teaching, which the chair will know better than the external 
reviewer, or on factors like publishing, where a chair could give a more generous, and 
less accurate, interpretation of the faculty research record than an external reviewer 
would provide. 
 With contracting out we generally observe in any relationship a series of 
contracts, periodically renegotiated. At each renegotiation either party has the option of 
leaving the relationship and looking elsewhere for someone with whom they can do 
business. But during the relationship there will typically have been much investment in 
relationship-specific assets that have no value elsewhere, and so what might have begun 
as a contracting relationship set in a competitive environment becomes a bilateral 
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monopoly – a “thin market” (Williamson, 1975). A common theme in the contracting-out 
literature is that nonprofit organizations who develop relationships with government 
funders can find themselves somewhat “trapped”; if the nonprofit has made many 
investments in the particular relationship but government can more easily switch 
suppliers, the government gains bargaining power in subsequent renegotiations.  
 
Procurement 
Quality monitoring also raises problems in procurement. Let’s take a crude 
criticism of the faith-based initiative: that it is simply a way to transfer public funds to 
religion. Is this plausible? There are circumstances where a group favored by the 
government cannot receive direct subsidy, as this would provoke a public outcry. For 
religious organizations there is, of course, the additional factor of constitutional law. But 
indirect support can occur. 
 Coate and Morris (1995) examine when procurement can be used to transfer funds 
to special interests without attracting public opposition: such a scheme works well (for 
the manager in charge of procurement and his interests, not the general public!) when its 
benefits are difficult for the public to evaluate. This is particularly true of social welfare 
programs, where most members of the public are not actual recipients of the service, (see 
Seabright (2002) for a study of how the separation of the funders of a program and its 
beneficiaries has implications for organizational design) and where there are enough 
unobservable random factors affecting outcomes that it is very difficult to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the design and implementation of the program. 
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Celentani and Ganuza (2002) add that more corruption in procurement – where 
“corruption” is not limited to bribery, but can simply take the form of a departure from 
merit as the criterion for awarding contracts – is possible when there are many “quality” 
aspects to bidding. Discrimination in the awarding of contracts is hard to detect. 
Consider, for example, the difficulties in determining in government contracting whether 
minority-owned businesses are not receiving the number of contracts one would predict 
(Celec, et. al., 2000). 
 
Contracting With Faith-Based Organizations 
What is “Charitable Choice” about? Since the 1960s there has been a great 
expansion in government contracting with (mostly) nonprofit organizations to deliver 
public services (Grønbjerg and Salamon, 2002; Smith, 1999). During that period of 
expansion there was certainly substantial contracting with organizations that are “faith-
based” (Although we should perhaps distinguish between nonprofit organizations with an 
affiliation to a denomination, but which operate much the same as a secular nonprofit 
human services agency – what Smith and Sosin (2001) call a “faith-related” organization 
– and those institutions whose operations are more explicitly influenced by their faith, 
here we follow the common practice in the literature of simply using the term “faith-
based” somewhat indiscriminately): “Religious mega-charities like Catholic Charities, 
Lutheran Social Services, Jewish Federations, and others have literally received tens of 
billions of dollars in public support. The only nonprofit organizations that have 
consistently been left out are grassroots religious groups” (DiIulio, 2004, p. 86). 
Charitable Choice, introduced through the welfare reforms of 1996, and expanded under 
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President G.W. Bush as the faith-based initiative, means to make eligible for government 
contracting the one group that had been left out. The large charities mentioned above are 
treated as “essentially secular organizations with a religious link or inspiration” (Carlson-
Thies, 2004, p. 59), but there have been claims that smaller faith-based organizations 
have faced discrimination in contracting, even when their programming was purely 
secular. These faith-based organizations should be distinguished from congregations, 
which for the most part do not operate their own human services programs but instead 
contribute to service provision through coordinating the efforts of volunteers to work 
with other nonprofit organizations, which might in some cases be secular; Chaves (2004) 
points out that, for 1998, only 3% of US congregations received any funding from 
government.  
The rules comprising Charitable Choice are that (1) no organization can be 
excluded from federal funding because it is religious, (2) the government must respect the 
religious character of faith-based providers, which includes allowing the institutions to 
maintain their religious character and can take this into account in hiring staff, (3) respect 
for the religious liberty of clients must be maintained, which means ensuring that 
alternatives are available for clients who do not wish to deal with faith-based providers, 
and (4) the public funds must be used for the public purpose for which they were 
intended, and cannot be used to fund inherently religious activities (Carlson-Thies, 2004, 
p. 61). 
Are the services provided by faith-based organizations different as a result of the 
religious beliefs of the employees? Discussing the faith-based initiative, James Q. Wilson 
writes: “religion’s chief contribution to morality is to enable people to transform their 
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lives. …We come to know God and through Him to know ourselves. And what we learn 
about ourselves is, I suspect, quite unsettling” (2000, p. 163). But Charitable Choice is 
not about getting human services clients to get religion, and while volunteers and staff at 
faith-based organizations might be motivated by their religious beliefs, they do not tend 
to deliver services markedly differently, or more “holistically,” than secular organizations 
(Monsma and Mounts, 2001). 
Based on what we have learned from the economics of contracting, what can we 
say about Charitable Choice, and, as discussed above, the efforts in some of the states to 
relax the current restrictions on funding of faith-based organizations? 
Contracting out works best when there is more competition between potential 
service providers; competition forces providers to be more conscious of costs, it provides 
greater incentives to search for quality innovations, and it allows service providers to 
learn from the successes and failures of competing organizations. This is a benefit of 
extending the set of organizations eligible to contract with government to include faith-
based organizations: a larger pool of service providers means more competition. But as 
an aside, remember that contracting with faith-based organizations requires competition, 
since clients must have the option of receiving a service to which they are entitled from a 
secular or state provider if they do not wish to use the religious-based provider. 
Government contractors cannot perfectly and completely specify in contracts 
every aspect of service delivery, and neither can they perfectly and completely monitor 
what the contracting agency has done. An advantage of contracting with nonprofits rather 
than for-profits in service delivery occurs when the government is especially worried that 
the profit motive of firms might lead them to make unobservable cuts in quality. In 
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contracting with faith-based organizations, government has a goal of not tying service 
delivery to anything that would force the client to participate in religious services or to 
endure proselytizing he does not wish to hear. To a large degree restrictions on what 
service providers may or may not do in terms of religious content can be specified in a 
contract: for example, that the service provider cannot require attendance at religious 
services, but that the service provider is allowed to keep some religious symbols in the 
place where the provider meets the client. To the degree these factors can be put in a 
contract and monitored, we mitigate our concerns over contracting with faith-based 
organizations. Might some churches surreptitiously breach the provisions of the contract? 
Of course, but that is not unique to faith-based organizations – secular nonprofits, and 
government employees, can and do quietly depart from their contracted duties. Is the 
problem worse with faith-based organizations than with secular nonprofits? To this point 
there is little evidence (see Minow (2003) for a less sanguine view of the monitoring 
problem in contracting out). 
Will contracting with government change the way faith-based organizations 
deliver programs that in the past were privately funded? We would expect so. James Q. 
Wilson (2000) writes: “Government aid tends to turn recipients into the organizational 
equivalent of the bureaucracy that supplies the aid. The essence of the religious 
experience is … not one that could be supplied under the aegis of the Federal Register 
and the United States Code.” There is a vast amount of evidence on how contracting with 
government changes the nature of secular nonprofits, from the mission of the 
organization to the role of the boards of trustees, and it is hard to imagine that any 
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religious organization entering into a contract agreement with government would be 
immune to change. There are two things to say about this. 
First, a change in the goals, strategies, and accountability mechanisms of a 
nonprofit organization in light of the possibility of partnership with government is not 
necessarily a bad thing. While we warn our nonprofit students about so-called mission 
drift, that is more a problem of changing policy without knowledge, reflection, and 
strategy. A conscious decision to pursue opportunities in the provision of public services 
where government is adjusting its priorities and policies is not the same as drift, and may 
well be for the good. 
Second, if the leadership of a religious organization makes a decision to adjust its 
programs in light of opportunities for contracting with government, is it not their decision 
to make? From a public policy perspective, it is not clear that the government should say 
to any type of organization: “we won’t contract with you, because you might change in 
order to meet our priorities.” There are distinguished scholars of public policy, 
themselves religious believers, who strongly caution churches about entering into 
contracts with the government. It is a good thing for faith-based organizations to know 
what they would be getting in to, but it is not clear why from a public policy perspective 
we would think it alright for secular nonprofits to make adjustments in light of 
government contracts but feel faith-based organizations need special protection from such 
changes. 
So far we have outlined why government contracting with faith-based 
organizations should be no cause for alarm, in the sense that we have not yet raised any 
critical differences, from the contracting perspective, between secular and religious 
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organizations. But now I will turn to what I see as a genuine concern. In the public policy 
textbooks the subject is outcomes: what policies and processes will efficiently and 
equitably deliver the goods. By equitably we mean on an equitable basis to clients. And 
as stated above, contracts with private agencies can specify what outcomes are desired 
and who is eligible to receive benefits. But if we leave the policy textbooks and open the 
newspaper, we see a different concern in the provision of government services: who is 
doing the providing? Who gets hired, and is any group receiving preferential treatment? 
Unfortunately, many people evaluate government programs not according to the quality 
of service provided to clients, but according to how many and who gets hired to do the 
service provision. Who would deny that this is a crucial issue in the vouchers debate? 
If the government were to begin contracting with faith-based organizations to a 
great degree, even if it tried to award contracts on the basis of quality and cost of service 
provision, I speculate that it would not be long before there were investigations into the 
denominational distribution of contracts. There will be questions about the impartiality of 
the granting of contracts, whether denominations outside the mainstream are getting a fair 
chance to compete for contracts (and whether they deserve a fair chance), and ultimately 
to whether the government is favoring a particular religious view. These questions will be 
raised regardless of any protests by government that it is simply contracting for delivery 
of human services, with strict provisions in the contracts forbidding requirements of 
religious observance or beliefs by clients, or of proselytizing.  
It is in the inevitable requirement that government not be seen to be favoring 
some denominations over others, while at the same time trying to award contracts on the 
basis of merit in the effective delivery of services, that we might see the biggest 
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difference between contracting out with secular organizations and any expansion of 
charitable choice. It is difficult enough for cash-strapped government departments to 
muster the staff and expertise needed to manage contracts with secular nonprofits, but 
how to resolve this dilemma? If contracts on merit result in Methodist churches being 
much more successful at getting government contracts than Baptist churches, could the 
state justify the outcome in terms of fair, competitive processes for tenders? Consider this 
warning by Melissa Rogers, the general counsel at the Baptist Joint Committee on Public 
Affairs:  
If lawmaking is like sausage-making, then the appropriations process is 
akin to the production of the cheapest, most questionable sausage in town. 
Religion enters this political fray at its peril. There is simply not enough 
tax money to fund every religious group in this country. Thus, the 
government will have to pick and choose when it awards grants and 
contracts. Elected officials will find it almost impossible to avoid playing 
politics with religion. Houses of worship may compete against one another 
for government contracts, and, all too often, only majority faiths will 
prevail. While government cannot heal all of the religious divisions in our 
country, it should not be in the business of driving us further apart. As our 
founders recognized, passing out government tax money to churches will 
do just that. (Rogers, 2000, p. 142).  
 One way to look at the Charitable Choice initiative is that it would improve the 
effectiveness of the delivery of publicly-funded programs by employing the resources of 
organizations that had previously been excluded from this market. But an alternative 
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narrative is that Charitable Choice serves to “level the playing field” (Kennedy, 2003) in 
the procurement of services, where that in and of itself is the goal. But equality in 
opportunity for procurement is a highly contested concept. Is this where the real issues 
will lie, and not in the actual quality of service provision, or how that quality is monitored 
by the state? Also note that the issue of equality in opportunity to provide services 
appears not only with the proponents of charitable choice wanting a level playing field 
for bidding on contracts, but also through opponents of the design of Charitable Choice, 
who object to organizations receiving public funds having the right to discriminate in 
employment on the basis of religious belief. 
 
Some Unanswered Questions 
 Does this discussion have implications for the debate over the use of vouchers? 
As stated earlier, the repeal of Georgia’s “Blaine Amendment”, which in essence is very 
much like the faith-based initiative at the federal government level, failed as a result of 
the fear that it would open the door to vouchers in schools, even though there is a 
reasonable amount of support for state contracting with faith-based organizations in 
human services. But if there is to be no discrimination against service providers in 
bidding for government contracts, why is there resistance to vouchers? The key change 
that arises from vouchers, once there is open bidding on service contracts, is that with 
vouchers the aggregated decisions of consumers of services directly determine the level 
of funding, rather than officers in the bureaucracy. With Charitable Choice, the only 
opposition to increased use of vouchers can be that the reallocation of funds and the 
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redistribution of case-loads that would result from the introduction of vouchers would be 
harmful. What is the basis of that charge? 
 The second unanswered question is how, in our analysis of public policy, we are 
to treat religious belief. Consider this statement by a proponent of Charitable Choice, 
defending the right of faith-based organizations to discriminate on the grounds of 
religious belief in employment: 
Given the history of discrimination in America’s past (and present), it is 
neither surprising nor inappropriate that great attention should be devoted 
to employment practices in the context of the faith-based initiative. The 
key question is this: When a federally funded faith-based organization 
makes staffing decisions based on religion, is it acting like many 
prominent secular institutions did a hundred years ago in rejecting 
employment, enrollment or membership to Jews, Catholics, and other 
minorities? Or is it behaving like current Democratic members of the U.S. 
Senate, for instance, who presume a right to hire only true-believing 
Democrats? (Carlson-Thies, 2004, p. 69). 
 He doesn’t answer the question directly, but it is surprising that through the large, 
and rapidly increasing, literature on the faith-based initiative there is so little discussion 
of what is the nature of faith. Of course there is understanding that “faith-based” 
individuals believe in God and that related to this belief is a motive to do good for those 
in need, while recognizing that those without such belief, who would see humanity as 
“robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes” 
(Dawkins, 1976, p. vii), might have the same motives, albeit from a different source. But 
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religious belief, in so many of our policies, is treated as a different kind of belief than 
belief of whether Democrats have better policies than Republicans. This has implications 
for the faith-based initiative. And it is a question that has perhaps been overshadowed by 
the efforts to interpret religion and policy through the lens of the First Amendment. But 
exploration of how, in a policy setting, we wish to treat religious belief, could help shed 
some light on the faith-based initiative.       
 
References 
Carlson-Thies, S.W. “Implementing the faith-based initiative.” The Public Interest, 2004, 
no. 155 (Spring), 57-74. 
Celec, S.E., Voich, D., Nosari, E.J., and Stith, M.T. “Measuring disparity in government 
procurement: Problems with using Census data in estimating availability.” Public 
Administration Review, 2000, 60(2), 134-142.  
Celentani, M., & Ganuza, J.-J. “Corruption and competition in procurement.” European 
Economic Review, 2002, 46, 1273-1303. 
Chaves, M. Congregations in America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. 
Coase, R.H. “The nature of the firm.” Economica, 1937, 4, 386-405. 
Coate, S., and Morris, S. “On the form of transfers to special interests.” Journal of 
Political Economy, 1995, 103(6), 1210-1235.  
Dawkins, R. The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976. 
DiIulio, J.J. “Getting faith-based programs right.” The Public Interest, 2004, no. 155 
(Spring), 75-88. 
Government Contracting with Faith-Based Providers 
 23
Francois, P. “‘Public service motivation’ as an argument for government provision.” 
Journal of Public Economics, 2000, 78, 275-299. 
Glaeser, E.L., and Shleifer, A. “Not-for-profit entrepreneurs.” Journal of Public 
Economics, 2002, 81, 99-115. 
Grønbjerg, K.A., and Salamon, L.M. “Devolution, marketization, and the changing shape 
of government-nonprofit relations.” In L.M. Salamon (ed.), The State of Nonprofit 
America. Washington: Brookings Institution, 2002.  
Grossman, S.J., and Hart, O.D. “The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical 
and lateral integration.” Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94(4), 691-719. 
Hansmann, H. “The role of nonprofit enterprise.” Yale Law Journal, 1980, 89(5), 835-
901. 
Hart, O. “Incomplete contracts and public ownership: Remarks, and an application to 
public private partnerships.” Economic Journal, 2003, 113, C69-C76. 
Hart, O., and Moore, J. “Property rights and the nature of the firm.” Journal of Political 
Economy, 1990, 98(6), 1119-1158. 
Hart, O., and Moore, J. “Foundations of incomplete contracts.” Review of Economic 
Studies, 1999, 66, 115-138.  
Hart, O., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R.W. “The proper scope of government: Theory and 
an application to prisons.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997, 112(4), 1126-
61. 
Kennedy, S.S. “Tilting the level playing field: Public administration meets legal theory.” 
Brooklyn Law School Journal of Law and Policy, 2003, 11(2), 495-523. 
Nonprofit Studies Working Paper 
 24
Minow, M. “Public and private partnerships: Accounting for the new religion.” Harvard 
Law Review, 2003, 116, 1229-1270. 
Monsma, S.V., and Mounts, C.M. “Working faith: How religious organizations provide 
welfare-to-work services.” Center for Research on Religion and Urban Civil 
Society, 2001. 
Rogers, M. “The wrong way to do right: A challenge to charitable choice.” In E.J. Dionne 
Jr. and John J. DiIulio (eds.), What’s God got to do with the American 
Experiment? Washington: Brookings Institution, 2000. 
Seabright, P. “Conflicts of objectives and task allocation in aid agencies.” In B. Martens 
et. al., The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002. 
Shleifer, A. “State versus private ownership.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1998, 
12(4), 133-150. 
Smith, S.R. “Government financing of nonprofit activity.” In E.T. Boris and C.E. 
Steuerle (eds.), Nonprofits and Government: Collaboration and Conflict. 
Washington: Urban Institute, 1999. 
Smith, S.R., and Sosin, M.R. “The varieties of faith-related agencies.” Public 
Administration Review, 2001, 61(6), 651-669. 
Tirole, J. “The internal organization of government.” Oxford Economic Papers, 1994, 
46(1), 1-29. 
Tirole, J. “Incomplete contracts: Where do we stand?” Econometrica, 1999, 67(4), 741-
781. 
Government Contracting with Faith-Based Providers 
 25
Whinston, M. “Assessing the property rights and transaction-cost theories of firm scope.” 
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 2001, 91(2), 184-188. 
Williamson, O.E. Markets and Hierarchies. New York: Free Press, 1975. 
Williamson, O.E. “Public and private bureaucracies: A transaction cost economics 
perspective.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 1999, 15(1), 306-342. 
Wilson, J.Q. “Religion and public life.” In E.J. Dionne Jr. and John J. DiIulio (eds.), 




























Nonprofit Studies Working Paper 
 26
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
